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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(d) (1994), providing 
for appellate jurisdiction by the Court of Appeals over appeals 
from the circuit courts. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues before this Court are 1) whether the Circuit 
Court abused its discretion by entering the judgment by default 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) against defendants for 
failure to respond to discovery; and 2) whether the circuit 
court's refusal to set aside the judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(1) was an abuse of discretion. 
Standard of Review; The Court reviews both the entry of 
default judgment and the refusal to set it aside as to whether 
the Circuit Court abused its discretion. Arnica Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Shettler. 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah App. 1989); Tucker 
Realty v. Nunlev. 396 P.2d 410, 412. 
Appellant must clearly show an abuse of discretion; it is 
not enough to show that some basis may exist to set aside the 
default. Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Osquthorpe, 259 Adv. 
Rep. 36, 39 (Utah 1994); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 
1986). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following statutes which bear on the resolution of the 
issues presented are reproduced in Addendum A to this brief: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(c) 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 55 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (7) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendants appeal a default judgment in favor of plaintiff 
Michael A. Mower entered August 25, 1994 (R. at 189-90), and from 
an order denying defendant's motion to set aside the judgment 
dated September 22, 1994 (R. at 234-36), of the Third Circuit 
Court of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Division, the Honorable 
Sheila K. McCleve presiding. A copy of the circuit court's 
orders are attached in Addendum B to this Brief. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The plaintiff Michael Mower initially filed this action on 
August 13, 1993 seeking to foreclose a mechanics lien on the 
residence of defendant James A. Craghead (defendant Craghead) for 
materials and labor provided to the residence for the benefit of 
defendant Craghead (R. at 1-6). Plaintiff filed an Amended 
Complaint on January 24, 1994, stating causes of action for 
breach of contract and quantum meruit against defendant Craghead 
and against defendant Lynn Padan, Inc. (defendant Padan), general 
contractor for the remodeling of the Craghead residence. (R. at 
7-13.) 
On March 28, 1994, plaintiff served defendants by mail, 
through counsel, with Plaintiff's First Request for Production of 
Documents to Defendants James D. Craghead and F. Lynn Padan, and 
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Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories to Defendants James D. 
Craghead and F. Lynn Padan. (R. at 48.) 
On May 10, 1994, ten days after defendants1 responses to 
discovery were due, plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to defen-
dants' counsel reminding him defendants' responses were past due, 
(R. at 73.) On May 17, 1994, receiving no response, plaintiff 
filed his first Motion to Compel Discovery. (R. at 49-73; 80-
104.) Defendants did not respond. On June 9, 1994, 40 days 
after defendant's responses to discovery were due, the circuit 
court entered an order giving defendants ten days within which to 
answer the discovery, and awarding to plaintiff costs and fees 
incurred in bringing the motion. (R. at 78-79). 
On June 17, 1994, within the ten days required by the Court, 
defendants filed a certificate of service with the Court, and 
provided limited and incomplete responses to the interrogatories. 
No documents were provided. (R. at 105-106.) On June 21, 1994, 
plaintiff's counsel wrote a letter to defendants' counsel re-
questing that documents be delivered before the deposition of 
defendant Padan scheduled for June 24, 1994. The letter also 
informed defendants that their answers to the interrogatories 
were inadequate, and stated why plaintiff felt entitled to more 
complete responses. (R. at 139.) 
On June 24, 1994, as agreed by the parties through counsel 
in an earlier telephone call, counsel for plaintiff filed a 
notice continuing the deposition of defendant Padan in order to 
give defendants until July 5, 1994 to produce documents. (R. at 
3 
107.) Defendants failed to produce the documents as agreed. On 
July 7, 1994, 68 days after defendants1 responses to discovery 
were due, plaintiff filed his second motion to compel, along with 
supporting memorandum. (R. at 109-139.) 
Again, defendants did not respond. Although defendant Padan 
produced a few documents at his deposition on July 8, 1994, he 
did not produce all requested documents, and had still failed to 
answer the interrogatories. Defendant Craghead did not produce 
any discovery, or respond in any way to plaintiff's motion. 
On July 20, 1994, 81 days after defendants1 responses to 
discovery were due, plaintiff mailed a copy of a Notice to Submit 
for Decision on his motion to compel, and mailed a copy of the 
notice to defendants1 counsel on July 20, 1994, which was filed 
with the circuit court on July 22, 1994. (R. at 140-141). On 
July 26, 1994, in a summary disposition, the circuit court 
granted plaintiff's motion and awarded attorneys1 fees. The 
circuit court, in its minute entry, also ordered defendants to 
respond within 2 0 days or their answer would be stricken and a 
default judgment entered against them. (R. at 142.) 
On August 2, 1994, 93 days after defendants' responses to 
plaintiff's discovery were due, plaintiff's counsel mailed to 
defendants' counsel a copy of a proposed order reflecting the 
circuit court's decision. The order states in relevant part: 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted. Defendants 
are to provide their response to plaintiff's discovery 
within 2 0 days or defendants' answer will be deemed 
stricken and judgment entered. 
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(R. at 148.) The language contained in the order is almost 
identical to the minute entry of July 26, 1994, which states: 
Attnys fees awarded/defendants respond w/in 2 0 days or 
answer stricken and judgment entered. 
(R. at 142.) 
On August 4, 1994, the circuit court entered the order, 
granting plaintiff's motion to compel and awarding fees, and 
ordering defendants to respond within 2 0 days or their Answers to 
plaintiff's Complaint would be stricken. (R. at 143-49.) On 
August 9, 1994, 100 days after their responses were due, defen-
dants filed a motion objecting to the order. Defendants, howev-
er, still did not respond to the discovery (R. at 150-165.) 
On August 19, 1994, ten days after defendants' objection to 
the order was filed, 2 3 days following the circuit court's minute 
entry, and following defendants1 continued noncompliance with the 
court's order, plaintiff filed a responsive motion, seeking entry 
of judgment. (R. at 167-186). On August 24, 1994, 28 days after 
the minute entry, and 2 0 days after the entry of the order, 
defendants had still not complied with the court's order. On 
August 25, 1994, 149 days after the discovery was served, and 116 
days after responses were due, the circuit court entered Judgment 
against defendants, striking defendants' answer, dismissing their 
counterclaim, and awarding plaintiff the amount of his lien, and 
his costs and fees. (R. at 187-191.) 
On August 29, 1994, defendants' filed a motion to set aside 
the default. On September 9, 1994, defendants' filed a supple-
mental memorandum in support of their motion and a Notice to 
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Submit for Decision. (R. at 207-213.) The circuit court denied 
the motion in a minute entry dated September 12, 1994, which was 
formalized in an order filed September 23, 1994. (R. at 231, 
234-366.) On October 12, 1994, defendants filed their Notice of 
Appeal. (R. at 237-238.) 
C Statement of Facts 
As provided by Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, plaintiff does not repeat the statement of facts 
offered by defendants. Plaintiff disputes the alleged burglary 
was the reason for defendants1 failure to respond to discovery 
and comply with the circuit court's orders. Some additional 
facts contained in the record, are offered for consideration in 
resolving this appeal: 
1. Defendants1 own counsel admits his clients1 failure to 
comply with discovery was due to their failure to cooperate with 
their counsel. (App. Br. at 6., n.4.) 
2. The alleged burglary claimed by defendants as making 
response impossible took place well after the time defendants 
were required to respond, and after one motion to compel had been 
granted and a second motion filed. (R. at 164.) 
3. There is no evidence in the record that the burglary 
was a reason for defendant Padan's failure to produce documents 
not on a computer disc, for defendant Craghead's failure to 
provide any documents, or for both defendants failure to answer 
interrogatories. 
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4. Defendants called plaintiff's counsel on July 26, 1994, 
allegedly to notify her of the burglary. When plaintiff returned 
defendant Padan1s call, however, defendant Padan was unavailable. 
Despite the fact that plaintiff's counsel left a message, defend-
ant Padan did not try to contact plaintiff's counsel again. (R. 
at 163.) Neither plaintiff or his counsel was notified of the 
burglary until August 4, 1994, over a week after the minute entry 
giving defendants twenty days to respond to discovery. (R. at 
158.) 
5. On August 4, 1994, on first learning of the burglary, 
plaintiff's counsel wrote defendants' counsel, asking for a list 
of documents believed stolen. Defendants' counsel did not re-
spond . Add. C. 
6. No evidence or argument was introduced at the trial 
court level respecting the action referred to in defendants' 
brief, Martin Bennett v. James Craghead, Aspen Construction, 
Michael A. Mower, et al, Civil No. 930904047CV. Furthermore, 
that action was decided by a default judgment based on pro se 
plaintiff Bennett's failure to respond to the Motion to Dismiss 
filed by Lynn Padan, aka Aspen Construction. Mower was a co-
defendant with Craghead and Padan in that matter, and there is no 
order barring Bennett from collecting from Mower the value of the 
materials and labor provided as subcontractor for Mower, or 
releasing Mower from his obligation to Bennett, or releasing 
defendants Craghead and Padan from their obligations to co-
defendant Mower. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A trial court has discretion, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(C), to render a judgment by default against a party who 
fails to comply with discovery. Rule 55 Utah R. of Civ. P. 
provides a party seeking to set aside a default judgment must do 
so pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). It is then within the 
discretion of the trial court whether or not to grant the motion. 
A denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment will not be 
disturbed, even if there were some basis on which a default judg-
ment could have been set aside, unless defendants can clearly 
prove an abuse of discretion. 
The record shows defendants were granted numerous opportuni-
ties to respond to discovery, including extensions of time and 
two motions to compel. Defendants1 failure to respond to discov-
ery in this case was due to their own negligence, their failure 
to cooperate with their counsel, and their disregard of the 
judicial process. The record contains sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
in entering a default judgment against defendants for their 
failure to respond 
Nor did the circuit court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendants1 motion to set aside the default pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ P. 60(b). The evidence contained in the record supports the 
trial court's rulings. The record shows the burglary, which 
defendants claim made response impossible, took place over two 
months after the time defendants were required to respond, and 
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after one motion to compel had been granted and a second motion 
filed. In addition, the record contains no evidence the alleged 
burglary kept defendant Padan from providing documents not on the 
computer discs allegedly stolen, or was the reason for defendant 
Craghead's failure to produce any documents, or kept either of 
the defendants from answering interrogatories. At best, the bur-
glary only offers a limited justification. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence either of the defendants1 attempt to notify plaintiff 
of the burglary and make other arrangements concerning discovery 
until after the second motion was submitted for decision. 
Instead, the record shows a constant disregard and lack of 
diligence by defendants to comply with plaintiff's requests and 
the court's orders. Defendants failed to meet their burden of 
showing a clear abuse of discretion by the circuit court. The 
entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff should be affirmed, and 
plaintiff should be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING 
DEFENDANTS1 ANSWER AND ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) states in relevant part: 
If a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit 
discovery...the court in which the action is pending 
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are 
just, and among others the following:...(C) an order 
striking out pleadings or...rendering a judgment by 
default against the disobedient party. 
(Add. A.) 
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"The entry of default judgment as a sanction based on failure to 
fulfill discovery obligations is within the discretion of the 
trial court." Shoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 
585 (Utah App. 1990); Tucker Realty v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410, 412 
(Utah 1964). The sanction of default is justified "without 
reference to whether the unexcused failure to make discovery was 
wilful." W.W.& W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 
568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977). 
A lower court's granting of a default judgment is presumed 
to be correct and shall not be disturbed "unless it is shown [the 
court's] action is without support in the record, or is a plain 
abuse of discretion." Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Shettler, 
768 P.2d at, 961 (Utah App. 1989); Tucker Realty v. Nunlev, 396 
at 412. "That some basis may exist to set aside the default does 
not require the conclusion that the court abused its discretion 
in refusing to do so when the facts and circumstances support the 
refusal." Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Osguthorpe, 259 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 36, 39 (Utah 1995); citing Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 
93 (Utah 1986). 
In Shoney v. Memorial Estates, 790 P.2d 584, 586, this Court 
affirmed the district court's granting of a default judgment to 
defendants as a sanction against plaintiff for failure to respond 
to discovery served on plaintiffs less than two months before, 
finding the absence of a motion to compel did not require a 
finding of abuse of discretion because there was ample evidence 
in the record supporting the court's decision, id. at 586. 
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In this case, there is also ample evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's decision to enter a default judgment. 
The defendants in this case were granted even more opportunities 
to respond than was the plaintiff in Shoney. Unlike in Shoney, 
defendants in this case had already been served with two motions 
to compel the requested discovery, and had been given notice of a 
twenty-day time period in which to respond, before judgment was 
entered. Defendants were given an excess of three additional 
months to respond to discovery. Within that time period, defen-
dants were repeatedly reminded by plaintiff's counsel and by the 
Court of their obligations. 
Furthermore, defendants' own counsel admits that "[b]etween 
March 28 and May 17 the defendants' counsel was unable to obtain 
his clients' cooperation to adequately respond to the Interroga-
tories and Request for Documents." (App. Br. at 6.) 
Defendants' counsel also claims he did not file a response 
to plaintiff's first motion to compel "due to his clients not 
taking time to provide responses." (App. Br. at 6, n.4.) 
The record also reflects that when defendants finally did 
file responses, the responses were insufficient, with several 
interrogatories left completely unanswered, and with no documents 
produced. The record also shows that, although plaintiff's 
counsel agreed to continue the deposition of Padan to allow 
defendants more time to produce the documents, defendants still 
failed to comply, requiring plaintiff to file a second motion to 
compel. (R. at 113, 111.) 
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The record also shows that defendants did not file any 
responsive pleading to either motion to compel. There is ample 
evidence of defendants1 continual failure to comply. This Court 
should affirm the circuit court's decision granting judgment in 
favor of plaintiff. 
II. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION; DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
Defendants also appeal the trial courtfs refusal to set 
aside the default judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) states in 
relevant part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect...or (7) 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. 
(Add. A.) 
In ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), the trial court is afforded 
broad discretion "and its determination will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion." Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 
1117 (Utah App. 1989). The trial court's ruling is such cases 
will not be revered by the appellate court "merely because the 
motion could have been granted." State by and Through Div. of 
Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983) 
(citations omitted). 
On August 4, 1994, over three months after defendants' 
responses were due, the circuit court signed an order reflecting 
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it's minute entry of July 26, 1994, granting plaintiff's Motion 
to Compel and for fees. (R at 147-148; Add. B.) 
Even though the circuit court had not yet entered a default 
judgment, but had only entered an Order granting fees and giving 
defendants 20 days to comply, on August 9, 1994, defendants filed 
an objection to the Order entered on August 4th pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (7), stating that a burglary of defendant 
Padan's office on July 13, 1994, made compliance with the order 
impossible. (R. at 150-165.) 
The record does not support defendants' assertion that all 
compliance was impossible. Even accepting the burglary prevented 
production of documents on computer disks, there is no mention on 
the police report that the documents not on a computer disk, such 
as architectural plans, defendant Padan's 1992 and 1993 day 
planners, and bills, bids and invoices submitted by subcontrac-
tors, were stolen. (R. at 164-165.) Nor does the alleged 
burglary of Padan's office offer an explanation why both Padan 
and Craghead failed to complete their answers to the interrogato-
ries, or why Craghead failed to produce any documents. Defen-
dants had had the discovery for over three months, and had 
already been in default for failure to respond for over two 
months, before the alleged burglary even took place. The record 
is also void of any adequate explanation for defendants' tardi-
ness in notifying plaintiff of the alleged burglary, for failing 
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to produce to plaintiff's counsel a list of the documents alleg-
edly stolen, or for failing to produce discovery during the 
various opportunities allowed by the circuit court. 
Apart from burglary, the only other excuse offered by 
defendants for their continual failure to respond is the alleged 
illness of their counsel. As with the burglary, however, the 
alleged illness of counsel was not until July 20, 1995, almost 
three months after the responses were due. (R. at 155-156.)1 
Moreover, defendants1 excuses were considered by the circuit 
court, and the circuit court determined these factors to be 
insignificant. Whether the defenses or excuses raised by defen-
dants justified giving defendants even more time than the three-
month extension already given was a decision within the discre-
tion of the circuit court. It is well settled that it is the 
trial judge who is in the best position to make such a determina-
tion as whether to set aside a default judgment. Board of Educa-
tion v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1963). 
In the absence of an abuse of discretion, the Appellate 
Court "shpuld not undertake to substitute [its] idea of what is 
proper for that of the trial court." G.M. Leasing Corp. v. 
Murray First Thrift and Loan Co, 534 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Utah 1975). 
The circuit court could choose not to find the burglary as a 
1
 The defendants1 delay can best be ascertained by reviewing 
the various deadlines and extensions given plaintiff. Discovery 
was served March 28, 1994, making responses due on Monday, May 1, 
1994 (34 days). The Court's first order compelling discovery 
extended the deadline to June 19, 1994. The second order extend-
ed the deadline to August 24, 1994, 149 days after the discovery 
was mailed. 
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justification for setting aside the default, especially in the 
light of defendants' failure to provide sufficient evidence to 
excuse their near-total failure to respond. Defendants have 
failed to meet their burden of showing a clear abuse of discre-
tion; the circuit court's entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff 
should be affirmed. 
III. DEFENDANTS WERE GIVEN NOTICE OF THE TWENTY-DAY TIME 
LIMIT TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY. 
On August 24, 1994, the circuit court entered a default 
judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendants filed a second motion 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and (7) seeking to set aside the 
default judgment. (R. at 192-202.) Again, the record supports 
the trial court's refusal to set aside the judgment. 
In their motion, defendants claim there was no order pre-
pared concerning the deadline for discovery, in contravention of 
Rule 4-504(1) of the Code of Judicial Administration. This 
contention, however, is contradicted by the record. Both the 
circuit court's minute entry and the order clearly and explicitly 
refer to the 2 0-day time limitation: 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel granted. Attnys 
fees awarded. Defendants respond w/in 2 0 
days or answer stricken and judgment entered 
(Add. B; R. at 142;) 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted. Defendants 
are to respond within 2 0 days or defendants' answer 
will be deemed stricken and judgment entered. 
(Add. B; R. at 147-148.) 
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IV. DEPENDANTS1 ARGUMENT ON CLAIM PRECLUSION WAS NOT ARGUED 
BELOW, IS NOT CONTAINED IN THE RECORD, AND IS NOT 
BEFORE THE COURT. 
Defendants1 first motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) seeks to set 
aside the default judgment, claiming impossibility due to bur-
glary and excusable neglect due to illness of counsel. Their 
second motion seeks to set aside the judgment on the grounds that 
the procedural requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration were not met.2 
Defendants now seek to raise on appeal, a new argument—for 
the first time—that a default judgment granted defendant Padan 
in a different case in which Mower and defendant Craghead were 
co-defendants, bars plaintiff from recovery from defendants in 
this case. 
Defendants did not raise this issue below and are precluded 
from raising it on appeal. Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 
P.2d 1155 (Utah App. 1994); Rinqwood v. Foreign Autoworks, Inc., 
786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990); Brobera v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 
(Utah App. 1989). Nor does the default judgment entered against 
the plaintiff of the other case in favor of defendants Craghead 
and Padan preclude plaintiff's claims against defendants in this 
2
 Defendants also argued the Judgment should be set aside 
because they fully complied. (R. at 159.) Plaintiff disputed 
this. (R. at 216-17.) Furthermore, "a party has a certain 
specified time to answer; if he does not, he has failed to 
answer, and the opposing party may appropriately invoke the 
sanctions." Shoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d at 586 
(citations omitted). See also W.W. & W.B. Gardener v. Park W. 
Village, 568 P.2d at 737: "once the motions for sanctions has 
been filed, the opposing party may not preclude their imposition 
by making a belated response...." 
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action before the court.3 Nor are defendants freed from their 
legal obligations and liabilities to produce discovery and comply 
with the Court's orders in this case. In addition to being 
barred from being considered for not being raised below, defen-
dant's reliance on the other case is without merit, for it simply 
has no bearing on plaintiff's rights or defendants' obligations 
in this case; the circuit court's granting of judgment in favor 
of plaintiff should affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The circuit court's granting of a judgment by default in 
favor of plaintiff pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) against 
defendants for their continued failure to comply with discovery 
orders is supported by the record and was not an abuse of discre-
tion. Defendants' failure to respond arose despite the entry of 
two orders compelling discovery and the lapse of 149 days between 
the serving of the discovery and the order. The circuit court's 
denial of defendants' motions to set aside the judgment pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(1) and (7) is also supported by the record and does 
not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
3
 Claim preclusion only applies if the same issue was liti-
gated on the merits in a previous case that resulted in a final 
judgment. State Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 
944 (Utah App. 1992). In the Bennett case, relied on by defen-
dants, the issues on appeal in this case were never litigated; 
the court awarded defendants Craghead and Padan default for 
plaintiff's failure to file any pleadings after his complaint, 
and for failing to respond to defendant Craghead and Padan's 
Motion to Dismiss. See also State in Interest of J.J.T., 887 
P.2d 161 (Utah App. 1994); Madsen v. Borthick, 789 P.2d 245 (Utah 
1988) (issue preclusion is only available if the issue was fully, 
fairly and competently litigated in the first action). 
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Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating 
an abuse of discretion by the circuit court in either instance. 
Defendants' filing of the appeal has required plaintiff to incur 
further fees in supporting its position. The Court should affirm 
the decision of the circuit court entering judgment in favor of 
defendant, and the decision denying defendants' motions to set 
aside the judgment, and should award costs and fees to plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted this j u day of April, 1995. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
JENNIFER *C. FALK 
for Plaintiff/Appellee t^rneyi 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions facts not within his personal knowledge, 20 
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325. A.L.R.3d 756. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110. Formal sufficiency of response to request for 
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure tes- admissions under state discovery rules, 8 
timony of absent witness in civil case, admis- A.L.R.4th 728. 
sions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. Permissible scope, respecting nature of m-
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil quiry, of demand for admissions under modern 
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489. 
rules, to respond to request for admission of Key Numbers. — Discovery «=> 121 to 129. 
Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating 
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall 
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination be-
fore he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion 
made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision 
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reason-
able expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to 
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
oooi 
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(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Sub-
division (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders 
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such 
person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court 
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness 
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if 
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before 
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper 
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may 
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision 
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
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1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); City Consumer 
Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991); 
Cornish Town v. Roller, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah 
1991); Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co., 
818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991); Peterson v. Peterson, 
818 P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Quinn v. 
Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 
858 (Utah 1992); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); J.H. ex rel. D.H. v. West 
Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992); Ledfors 
v. Emery County Sen. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162 
(Utah 1993); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993); Shaw v. 
Layton Constr. Co., 854 P.2d 1033 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993); Brumley v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 230 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1994). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple 
Claims Under Rule 54(b): A Time for Reexami-
nation?, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 327. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error § 1009 et seq.; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs 
§§ 14, 26 to 36, 87 et seq.; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judg-
ments § 1. 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 49 
C.J.S. Judgments § 1. 
A.L.R. — Attorney's personal liability for 
expenses incurred in relation to services for cli-
ent, 15 A.L.R.3d 531; 66 A.LJEUth 256. 
Effect on compensation of architect or build-
ing contractor of express provision in private 
building contract limiting the cost of the build-
ing, 20 A.L.R.3d 778. 
Recoverability under property insurance or 
insurance against liability for property dam-
age of insured's expenses to prevent or miti-
gate damages, 33 A.L.R.3d 1262. 
Dismissal of plaintiffs action as entitling de-
fendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as 
"prevailing party" or "successful party," 66 
A.L.R.3d 1087. 
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing 
party" for purposes of awarding costs where 
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66 
A.L.R.3d 1115. 
Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses 
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
Rule 55. Default. 
Running of interest on judgment where both 
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099. 
Allocation of defense costs between primary 
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th 
107. 
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or 
other sanctions against attorney who fails to 
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial, 29 
A.L.R.4th 160. 
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus 
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457. 
Retrospective application and effect of state 
statute or rule allowing interest or changing 
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41 
A.L.R.4th 694. 
Obduracy as basis for state-court award of 
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
Modern status of state court rules governing 
entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80 
A.L.R.4th 707. 
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal 
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d), 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R. 
Fed. 168. 
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure 
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on 
multiple claims, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 24 to 
135; Costs «= 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq.; 
Judgment «=» 1. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative 
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by 
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his 
default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any 
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be neces-
sary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken 
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule 
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the 
nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for 
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publica-
tion or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of 
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against 
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is 
not an infant or incompetent person. 
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(2) By the court In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by 
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to 
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account 
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any 
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this 
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, 
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counter-
claim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 
54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judg-
ment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer 
or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief 
by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 




Failure to plead. 
Judgment. 
—Conduct of counsel. 
—Default entry necessary. 
—Failure to follow rule. 
—Hearing on merits. 
—Punitive damages. 
Notice. 
Setting aside default. 
—Collateral attack. 
—Direct attack. 





—Setting aside proper. 
Time for appeal. 
Cited. 
Damages. 
A default judgment establishes, as a matter 
of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff as 
to each cause of action alleged in the com-
plaint. Nevertheless, it is still incumbent upon 
the nondefaulting party to establish by compe-
tent evidence the amount of recoverable dam-
ages and costs he claims. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue 
of damages once default has been entered. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Divorce action. 
Defendant who failed to file answer in di-
vorce action was not entitled to hearing or no-
tice before entry of default divorce decree even 
though 90-day statutory period had not 
elapsed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1975). 
Failure to plead. 
In an action for modification of the custody 
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropri-
ate for the trial court to rule on appellee's peti-
tion, absent any responsive pleading, and to 
accept the allegations in the petition as true in 
resolving the threshold requirement of 
whether appellant's circumstances had materi-
ally changed; however, it does not follow that 
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial 
court asked to render a judgment by default 
must first conclude that the uncontroverted al-
legations of an applicant's petition are, on their 
face, legally sufficient to establish a valid 
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v. 
Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Judgment. 
Judgments by default are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of justice 
and fair play. Heathman v. Fabian & 
Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60,377 P.2d 189 (1962). 
—Conduct of counsel. 
When defendant's counsel was 27 minutes 
late on morning trial was commenced because 
he was unable to obtain from the Supreme 
Court a writ of prohibition to prevent the hold-
ing of the trial on that day due to absence of 
defense witnesses, the trial court erred in 
granting a default judgment to plaintiff and 
refusing to allow defense counsel to participate 
in the proceedings or challenge plaintiffs evi-
dence, notwithstanding any ill-advised, irritat-
ing or contemptuous conduct from defense 
counsel during the action, since the law prefers 
that a case be tried on its merits and the par-
ties litigant should not be made to suffer for 
the misconduct of their counsel. McKean v. 
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Absence of judge from courtroom during trial transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
 ai0ne new trial granted on ground of inade-
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
 q u a c y 0f damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 §75 
A.L.R.3d 126. Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
 damBgeB f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y to or death of sea-
mg motion for new trial m civil case of motion
 m a n ^ ^ ^ u n d e r J o n e g A c t ( 4 6 u s c s 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
 K <. ^ oox , . . r ., . 
A ., .. c . .' , . , 4. • 1 • Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
Authonty of state court to order jury trial in ^ 
civil case where jury has been waived or not m ( * e r n c a s e s ' y b A ' L ' K ***; r541 ' _, 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching a&es f o r Personal injury or death in actions un-
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on d e r Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. §§ 5 1 e t seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 189. 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. Key Numbers. — New Trial «=» 13 et seq., 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. to set aside judgment, § 21-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Mistake or inadvertence. 
„.
 xl . A.* . *. *» —Mutual mistake. 
Any other reason justifying relief. ^ R ^ I
 p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t 
—Default judgment. Appeals. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. Clerical mistakes. 
—Incompetent counsel. —Computation of damages. 
—Lack of due process. —Correction after appeal. 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UK 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL A. MOWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN 
PADAN aka ASPEN 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN 
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DO: 
NOS. 1 through 20, 
Defendants. 
TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
Civil No. 930009062 CV 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Based upon the motion of plaintiff Michael A. Mower, pursu-
ant to Utah R.Civ.P. 37(a) and Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-502, for 
an Order compelling defendants to respond to the Plaintiff's 
First Set of Interrogatories to Defendants James D. Craghead and 
F. Lynn Padan and Plaintiff's First Request for Production of 
Documents to Defendants James D. Craghead and F. Lynn Padan, and 
good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defen-
dants James D. Craghead and F. Lynn Padan have ten days within 
which to answer the said discovery requests. The Court further 
ORDERS that plaintiff may be awarded his costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in connection with this Motion to Compel. 
PQ0G6 
DATED this a 
*sC6<~sC^ 
y day of0f&%>, 1994, 
BY THE COURT 
SH£ElA K;JMCQ^EVE,^ j£{ 
CIRCUIT di 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing ORDER TO COMPEL DISCOVERY was mailed, postage 
prepaid, via U.S. Mail, this 1^ day of May, 1994, to: 
Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan: 
Joseph M. Chambers 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
31 Federal Avenue 
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P. O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL A. MOWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN 
PADAN aka ASPEN 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN 
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES 
NOS. 1 through 20, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL DISCOVERY 
Civil No. 930009062 CV 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record, hereby 
respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of his Motion to 
Compel Discovery. 
FACTS 
On March 28, 1994, plaintiff submitted to defendants the 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Produc-
tion of Documents. A true and correct copy of plaintiff's dis-
covery requests and the corresponding service are attached hereto 
as Exhibit "A". 
The defendant's responses were due on April 28, 1994, howev-
er, defendants failed to respond by that date. On May 10, 1994, 
•0308 
counsel for plaintiff sent the letter to defendants' counsel 
requesting the discovery responses. A true and correct copy of 
this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". No responses to 
the letter or the discovery have been received. 
Plaintiff has received no response to his discovery requests 
despite the aforementioned letter. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 37 of the Utah R. Civ. P. provides that a party may 
apply for an order compelling discovery if a party fails to 
answer interrogatories submitted under Rule 33 or allow inspec-
tion pursuant to a request made under Rule 34. 
Furthermore, Rule 37(d) provides that if a party fails to 
serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, the court may make such orders as are just. Under Rule 
37(d) the court may order the party failing to respond to 
interrogatories or the attorney advising the party, or both, to 
pay reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the 
failure. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests the 
Court to enter an order requiring defendants to respond to 
plaintiff's discovery requests. Plaintiff also requests the 
Court to award reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by 
plaintiff in bringing this Motion to Compel. 
- 2 -
130009 
DATED this j T~ day of May, 1994. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
LINCOLN W. HdBBS ^ 
JENNIFER L. \FALK 
Attorneys, fo^ Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL DISCOVERY was mailed, postage prepaid, via U.S. Mail, this 
1 T day of May, 1994, to: 
Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan; 
Joseph M. Chambers 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
31 Federal Avenue 
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LINCOLN W. HOBBS, Esq. #4846 
JENNIFER L. FALK, Esq. #4568 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 West 200 South #4000 
P. O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL A. MOWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN 
PADAN aka ASPEN 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN 
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES 
NOS. 1 through 20, 
Defendants. 
On July 7, 1994, plaintiff Michael Mower filed a Motion to 
Compel and For Sanctions, along with supporting memorandum, 
seeking to compel responses to certain interrogatories and for 
documents pursuant to discovery served by mail on defendants on 
March 28, 1994, and a Motion to Compel filed on May 18, 1994. 
On July 22, 1994, plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for 
Decision. There being no responsive pleading filed by defendants 
and the time for filing such responses having now run, 
The Court, having reviewed the file, and for good cause 
appearing, enters the following ORDER: 
ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Civil No. 930009062 CV 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
•0012 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted. Defendants are to 
provide their response to plaintiff's discovery within 20 days or 
defendants' answer will be deemed stricken and judgment entered. 
Plaintiff is awarded attorneys fees, against defendants 
for failure to provide requested discovery-
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this ^ day of August, ^ £§94r.. \.>x 
— / J * , / • * v ' ' 
BY 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY'S FEES was mailed, postage 
prepaid, via U.S. Mail, this cb^ day of August, 1994, to: 
Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan: 
Joseph M. Chambers 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
31 Federal Avenue 




LINCOLN W. HOBBS, E s q . #4846 
JENNIFER L. FALK, E s q . #4568 
WINDER & HASLAM, P . C . 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f 
175 West 2 0 0 S o u t h #4000 
P . O. Box 2 6 6 8 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 0 - 2 6 6 8 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 2 - 2 2 2 2 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL A. MOWER, 
: DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
P l a i n t i f f , : 
v s . : 
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN : Civil No. 930009062 CV 
PADAN aka ASPEN : Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN : 
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES 
NOS. 1 through 20, : 
Defendants. : 
In this action, the defendants, James D. Craghead and F. 
Lynn Padan aka Aspen Construction, Inc., having been regularly 
served with process, and having failed to appear and answer 
plaintiff's discovery requests on file herein, and the time 
allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of said 
defendants, James D. Craghead and F. Lynn Padan aka Aspen Con-
struction, Inc., in the premises is hereby duly entered according 
to law. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing DEFAULT CERTIFICATE was mailed, postage prepaid, 
via U.S. Mail, this 1 1 day of August, 1994, to: 
Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan; 
Joseph M. Chambers 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Courtesy copy hand delivered to: 
Honorable Sheila K. McCleve 
Circuit Court Judge 
451 South 200 East 
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P. O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
FILED 
AUG 2 5 1994 
Third Cirptrft Court 
Salt Lak^Department 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL A. MOWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN 
PADAN aka ASPEN 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MART] 
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES 
NOS. 1 through 20, 
Defendants. 
UDGMENT 
Civil No. 930009062 CV 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
On July 27, 1994, the Court ruled in plaintiff's favor, 
granting plaintiff's Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, granting 
plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. In so ruling, the Court 
ordered defendants to produce the requested discovery by no later 
than 20 days from the date of the Court's ruling, or judgment 
would be entered in favor of plaintiff. 
The defendants having failed to comply with the previous 
order of the Court, and based on the pleadings on file, and for 
good cause appearing, the Court enters Judgment against defen-
dants and in favor of plaintiff as follows: 
B0017 
1. The principal amount of $13,515.58, plus prejudgment 
interest from August 16, 1992. 
2. Dismissing defendants1 Counterclaim herein. 
3. Attorney's fees in the amount of $4,041.00 determined 
by the Court based on submission of Affidavit by plaintiff's 
counsel. 
4. Plaintiff's costs incurred herein in the amount of 
$594.35. 
5. Entry of Judgment on plaintiff's cause of action for 
foreclosure will be stayed. 
6. It is further ordered, pursuant to Rule 4-505 Code of 
Judicial Administration that this Judgment shall be augmented in 
the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in 
collecing said Judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be 
established by affidavit. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED t h i s %1 day of %sfit///kt/iyv . 1994. 




CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing JUDGMENT as mailed, postage prepaid, via U.S. Mail, 
this j W day of August, 1994, to: 
Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan: 
Joseph M. Chambers 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
2578\001\judgment / ] 
f 
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LINCOLN W. HOBBS, Esq. #4846 
JENNIFER L. FALK, Esq. #4568 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 West 200 South #4000 
P. O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL A. MOWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES D. CRAGHEAD, F. LYNN 
PADAN aka ASPEN 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., MARTIN 
BENNETT, JOHN and JANE DOES 
NOS. 1 through 20, 
Defendants. 
On July 17, 1994, the Court granted plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel and for Attorney's Fees and on August 4, 1994, entered an 
Order reflecting its earlier ruling. 
On August 24, 1994, the Court entered default judgment in 
favor of plaintiff against defendants awarding plaintiff the 
principal amount due, plus costs and fees for a total judgment of 
$18,150.93. Defendants filed an "Objection to Proposed Order 
(Default Judgment), Motion to Stay Entry of Default Judgment and 
in the Alternative Motion for Relief from Order and/or for a New 
Trial," along with supporting memorandum and affidavits on August 
ORDER 
Civil No. 930009062 CV 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
J?C/ 
P0021 
31, 1994, to which plaintiff filed a Response, defendants filed a 
Reply, and plaintiff filed a Supplemental Response. 
The Court, having reviewed the record and the pleadings 
filed herein, and for good cause appearing, affirms its ruling of 
September 14, 1994 and DENIES defendants' Objection to Proposed 
Order (Default Judgment), Motion to Stay Entry of Judgment, and 
in the Alternative Motion for Relief from Order and/or for a New 
Trial. 
- 2 -
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, via U.S. Mail, 
this / 9 - day of September, 1994, to: 
Attorneys for Defendants Craahead and Padan: 
Joseph M. Chambers 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
31 Federal Avenue 








WINDER & HASLAM 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
175 WEST 200 SOUTH JENNIFER L FALK 
P.O. BOX 2668 
SALT IAKE CTTY, UTAH 84110-2668 
FAX(801) 5323706 
(801) 322-2222 
August 4 , 1994 
Joseph M. Chambers VIA FACSIMILE #752-3556 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Re: Michael Mower v. James P. Craghead, et al 
Dear Joe: 
I have a phone message dated August 4, 1994, at 9:33 a.m. 
regarding "Lynn Padan's business burglarized-July 13th" and 
was further informed that you wanted me to know as to the 
reason we had not received responses to our discovery re-
quests- However, our discovery was originally sent on March 
28, 1994. Responses were due 30 days later and, even giving 
grace time for mailing, should have been filed the first of 
May, 
When we did receive responses, they were incomplete and we 
filed a Motion to Compel on July 6, 1994, after a letter dated 
June 21 and phone calls to you requesting that the responses 
be supplemented. No documents have been produced. A copy of 
my June 21 letter is enclosed. You have not explained how the 
alleged burglary of Mr. Padan's business on July 13 affects 
your ability to respond; unless you are alleging a burglar 
stole all of the documents we requested. Even so, you still 
have not responded to certain of our interrogatory requests. 
Nor do I see how the burglary would affect Cragheadfs ability 
to respond. 
As you know, our Motion for Sanctions was granted July 27, 
199 4 and you have twenty days from that date in which to fully 
respond to the discovery requests or judgment will be granted. 
We expect the answers to our interrogatories, along with all 
documents you do have in your possession by no later than 
August 17, 1994, the date designed by the Court. In addition, 
please send a list of those documents you allege you cannot 
deliver us due to the burglary. 
Sincerely, 
XjJk- 10324 
JENNIFER It. FALK 
,JLF:lbp 
